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reasonable mind from the testimony of the senses." (Emphasis added.)
In LeFavre v. State,28 the Maryland court stated "... an offense is com-
mitted in his presence or view if, through his senses he had knowledge of
facts or circumstances sufficient to justify a sincere belief that accused is
committing the misdemeanor in his presence." The New York court
stated in People v. Esposito,2 9 "If a police officer is in bodily reach of a
person then and there engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor, and
perceiving indications of the commission of the offense sufficient to induce
reasonable belief of the fact, acting in good faith, intending performance
of duty, proceeds to arrest such person, the arrest is lawful as for the
commission of a crime in the officer's presence." This seems to be what
the legislature intended by adding the clause "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that it is committed in his presence." Nor does it seem that the
legislature intended our statute to be broader than these interpretations.
Thus the test would seem to be: Has the officer observed enough facts
and circumstances through his senses or personal observation as should
reasonably cause him to believe that he is presently observing the com-
mission of the crime.
ROBERT L. GRUB, JR.
Eminent Domain in North Carolina-A Case Study
Eminent domain, a term attributable to the famous seventeenth centu-
ry jurist, Hugo Grotius, means the right of the state or of a person
acting for the state to use, alienate, or destroy property of a citizen for
the ends of public utility.1 This right, also called the power of con-
demnation, belongs to every independent government as an incident of
its sovereignty and needs no constitutional recognition. 2 The right is
founded upon the fact that such property is to be used only for the benefit
of the general publics and it is allowed only so far as it is necessary for
the proper construction and use of the improvement for which it is taken. 4
The policy underlying the authority to condemn is to prevent an owner
aware of the necessity of the taker from making the most of such necessity
and demanding an outrageously high price.5 With the upsurge in the
development of super highways and hydroelectric dams and the rede-
velopment of urban areas, eminent domain is an area of the law that is
gaining in importance in this state and elsewhere. Thus it seems worth-
"8208 Md. 52, 56, 116 A. 2d 368, 369 (1955), case reversed on lack of evidence
in 118 A. 2d 639 (1955).
29 118 Misc. 867, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326, 332 (Sp. Sess. 1922).
1Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 74 S. E. 2d 460 (1912).
'Jeffress v. Town of Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 2d 919 (1911).3 Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
'Spencer v. Willis, 179 N. C. 175, 178, 102 S. E. 275, 277 (1920) (dictum).5 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. 2d 10 (1941).
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while at this time to appraise the North Carolina case law on this sub-
ject.
Who can exercise the power of condemnation:
Since the power of condemnation is a sovereign power it can be ac-
quired only by legislative grant.6 Being in derogation of the ordinary
rights of private ownership the statutes conferring condemnation powers
are strictly construed. 7 Unless orderly procedure meeting the require-
ments of due process is specified, the grant of condemnation power is
invalid. This procedure may either be expressed in the statute granting
the power or in the general law.8 Yet within the constitutional limita-
tion that the power be exercised for a public purpose,9 the will of the
legislature is supreme; this means that delegating the power rests in the
sound discretion of the legislature, even to the extent of discriminating
among delegatees. 10 Thus, an electric power company which is a
riparian owner does not have condemnation powers for that reason
alone, 1 and even a municipal corporation has no such power unless
authorized by charter or general law.12  If the power of condemnation
is not expressly or clearly implied in the statute or if there is no provision
for compensation included, it is presumed that the legislature intended
that the property be obtained by contract.'3
Extent of the power of condemnation:
Since condemnation is a forced purchase, it is considered that the
owner should first have the opportunity to sell voluntarily. Therefore,
the condemnor must attempt to purchase the land before it has the right
to resort to condemnation.1 4 This prerequisite attempt is deemed to have
been made where the owner refuses to sell except at an excessive price, or
where the owner cannot convey because of some disability.15 Unless
excluded by statute, any kind of private property, real or personal may
be condemned. 6
Commissioners v. Bonner, 153 N. C. 66, 68 S. E. 970 (1910).
Sechriest v. Thomasville, 202 N. C. 108, 162 S. E. 212 (1932); Board of
Education v. Forrest, 193 N. C. 519, 137 S. E. 431 (1927); Mason v. Durham
County, 175 N. C. 638, 96 S. E. 110 (1918); Johnson City So. Ry. v. South &
W. R. R., 148 N. C. 59, 61 S E. 683 (1908).
8 See Eppley v. Bryson City, 157 N. C. 487, 73 S. E. 197 (1911).
Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905).
10 Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 175 N. C.
668, 96 S. E. 99 (1918).
11 Ibid.
'Lloyd v. Town of Venable, 168 N. C. 531, 84 S. E. 855 (1915).
1' Commissioners v. Bonner, 153 N. C. 66, 68 S. E. 970 (1910). An instance where
condemnation power was implied is found in Mountain Retreat Ass'n v. Mount
Mitchell Development Co., 183 N. C. 43, 110 S. E. 524 (1922) where the corporation
was given broad powers to maintain turnpikes in the state.
14 Greensboro v. Garrison, 190 N. C. 577, 130 S. E. 203 (1925) ; Plott v.
Western N. C. R. R., 65 N. C. 74 (1871)5 See Western Carolina Power Co. v. Moses, 191 N. C. 744, 133 S. E. 5 (1926).
"6 United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 (1903); Parks v. Board of County
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The power of condemnation is a continuing power, generally to be
exercised by the delegatee of the legislature when and to the extent that
public good may require, and the power is not exhausted by a single
exercise.17 Yet if an enabling statute does limit a condemnor to take
but a certain number of acres of land, the power is not exhausted until
the maximum acreage is acquired by virtue of condemnation ;1s land ac-
quired by purchase is disregarded in applying the statutory limitation. 19
The condemnor has no right to condemn only the soil and to disregard
the buildings, .for the property must be taken as it is or be rejected al-
together. It cannot move or compel the owner to move a building from
the land to be condemned onto adjacent property of the owner,20 for the
value of the building must be taken into account. However, the legisla-
ture has power to authorize payment for the land without the building
plus payment for the cost of removing the building to other land and
restoring it.21
The time, necessity, expediency, manner and method of condemna-
tion is within the absolute discretion of the condemnor in the absence of
oppression, and the courts have no jurisdiction as to whether the taking
is expedient or necessary.22 The question of reasonable necessity is in
issue only on the owner's allegations showing bad faith or an oppressive
abuse of discretion.23  Even a prior judgment of the superior court that
a certain street was not necessary for public purposes will not affect the
legislative act authorizing such to be condemned 24  The power of con-
demnation extends to the taking of the entire property permanently, even
though the most familiar example is a taking of a perpetual easement in
realty rather than a fee simple.235
The owner's right to just compensation:
The Federal Constitution and all the state constitutions except that of
North Carolina now contain express prohibitions against the taking of
private property for public use without compensation.2 Though the
North Carolina Constitution has no express provision for compensation,
Commn'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 120 S. E. 46 (1923); North Carolina & R. & D. R. R. v.
Carolina Cent. Ry., 83 N. C. 489 (1880).
"'Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N. C. 269, 76 S. E. 267 (1912).
"
8Board of Education v. Pegram, 197 N. C. 33, 147 S. E. 622 (1929).
9 Board of Education v. Forrest, 190 N. C. 753, 130 S. E. 621 (1925) ; Board of
School Trustees v. Hinton, 165 N. C. 12, 80 S. E. 890 (1914).
" Proctor v. State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n, 230 N. C. 687, 55 S. E.
2d 479 '(1949).
' See Goldsboro v. Holmes, 180 N. C. 99, 104 S. E. 140 (1920).
Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394 (1899).
" Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N. C. 269, 76 S. E. 267 (1912).
"Call v. Town of Wilkesboro, 115 N. C. 337, 20 S. E. 468 (1894).
= See cases cited in notes 3 and 20 supra, and notes 28, 112 and 123 infra.J AHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 36 (1953).
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"it is so well settled that private property cannot be taken directly or
indirectly, even for public purposes, without compensation, that it seems
a work of supererogation even to restate the principle. '2 7 The basis
seems to be that when North Carolina and its citizens entered into their
compact of ordered liberty and self restraints, the principle, although not
stated, was assumed by all to exist. This idea was expressed in the
leading case on this subject in 1837 by Chief Justice Ruffin in Raleigh
& Gaston R. R. v. Davis:28
"... If it be not incorporated therein, the omission must be
attributed to the belief of the founders of the government, that
the legislature would never perpetrate so flagrant an act of op-
pression, or that it would be tolerated by the people, but be re-
dressed by the next representatives chosen. There is no doubt
that while the legislature and the people of this state expressly
restrict the action of the general government on this subject, it
-must have been supposed by the people that their own local gov-
ernment was in like manner restrained, or would never act in a
manner to make such restraint necessary. There is, however, no
clause in that instrument [the constitution] which seems to bear on
that point unless it be [the present Article 1, Section 17, of the
North Carolina Constitution.]" [Italics added.]
The italicized portion of the above quoted material takes on special
significance in view of the fact that North Carolina at first refused to
ratify the Federal Constitution because there was not included a Bill of
Rights.29  Article 1, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution,
prohibits the taking of a person's property but by the "law of the land"
-the words of Magna Carta; this latter instrument was interpreted to
require just compensation from the Sovereign long before this country
became independent.3 0 Although equivocal statements may be found as
to the right of just compensation,3 the principle has never been denied3 2
"Phillips v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902).
2819 N. C. 451, 460 (1837). N. C. CoNST. art. 1, § 17: "No person ought to
be... in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the
land." Another provision which seems to relate to this matter is N. C. ColcsT.
art. 1, § 35: " . . . [Elvery person for an injury done him in his lands ... shall
have remedy by due course of law.... ."
20 LEFLER AND NEWsomE, NoRin CAROLINA 268-70 (1954).
30 Staton v. Norfolk & C. R. R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181 (1892) ; JAHR.
EMINENT Domix § 1 (1953).
" See State v. Glen, 52 N. C. 321, 334 (1859) : "... [The] legislature may,
perlhps, resume the incidental rights [to the nonnavigable river bed] for the public
use, without making compensation for them; though we believe it has often given
such compensation."
" See Yancey v. North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 222
N. C. 106, 22 S. E. 2d 256 (1942).
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The court buttresses this position by relying on justice and equity, which
is called the basis of the fundamental law.8 3
However the North Carolina Constitution be construed, statutes
which authorize a taking of private property must provide for compensa-
tion in order to be valid ;34 it is clear today that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees the owner just compensation for property taken by the
state.85 Whatever the constitutional basis, the strength of the mandate
is shown by the fact that this is apparently one situation where the state
may be sued without its consent.3 6 This writer concludes that the
principle of just compensation is simply a part of the North Carolina
provincial law which it retained upon becoming independent, T in the
same manner as it retained the idea that a petit jury must be composed
of twelve members.38
The requisite taking to require compensation:
"The word 'property' extends to every aspect of right and interest
capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a
money value. The term comprehends not only the thing possessed but
also, in strictly legal parlance, means the right of the owner to . . .pos-
sess, use, enjoy and dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude
others from its use."3 9  So, when a physical interference with the thing
possessed subverts one of these essential rights, such interference is a
"taking" of the owner's property. Not all losses of property are com-
pensable, however, for property may be confiscated by virtue of taxation
or restrictions imposed by the police power and may be destroyed in great
emergencies-such as in wartime4° or times of public calamity 4 ' without
"1 Sale v. State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N. C. 612, 89 S. E. 2d29o (1955).
' Parks v. Board of Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 120 S. E. 46 (1923) ; Bennett v.
Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 170 N. C. 389, 87 S. E. 133 (1915); Commis-
sioners v. Bonner, 153 N. C. 66, 68 S. E. 970 (1910).
"Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1896); see McKinney v.
Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107 (1950) and Yarborough v. North Carolina
Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
" Sale v. State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N. C. 612, 89 S. E. 2d
290 (1955); Dalton v. State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n, 223 N. C. 406,
27 S. E. 2d 1 (1943) ; see Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
" This conclusion is contrary to that reached by a writer on the subject in Note,
28 N. C. L. REv. 403, 405 (1950) who contended that the principle is a result ofjudicial fiat.
"State v. Berry, 190 N. C. 363, 130 S. E. 12 (1925). Here the verdict of
guilty rendered by less than twelve jurors was held unconstitutional.
"9 Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 219 N. C. 402, 408, 14 S. E.
2d 252, 256 (1941) ; Matthews v. Board of Corp. Commn'rs, 106 Fed. 7 (4th Cir.
1901).
"0 United States v. Caltex (Philippines), 344 U. S. 149 (1952) rehearing denied
344 U. S. 919 (1953). Here the military authorities destroyed oil and installations
belonging to a private corporation to keep the Japanese from getting it upon
capturing the island.
" Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16 (1879) (fire) ; see New Orleans Pub. Serv.
Co. v. New Orleans, 281 U. S. 682 (1930).
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compensation. Taxation is unlike eminent domain in that no specific
property is taken; the police power is unlike eminent domain in that the
police power fetters the rights of property while eminent domain takes
them away. But any direct encroachment on the property creates a
right in the owner to compensation.42
Parties entitled to compensation:
Only persons with some sort of ownership interest in the property
may receive compensation. The cases indicate that this interest need not
be an exclusive one, and that the damages will be given to the extent that
each person's interest in the property has in fact been taken.43 Among
" McKinney v Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107 (1950) ; Hildebrand v.
Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 219 N. C. 402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1941) ; Clinard v.
Town of Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939).
Instances where there was held a compensable taking are as follows: Matthews
v. Board of Corp. Commn'rs, 106 Fed. 7 (4th Cir. 1901) (utility rates fixed too
low); McLean v. Town of Mooresville, 237 N. C. 498, 75 S. E. 2d 327 (1953)
(sewer line) ; Moore v. Clark, 235 N. C. 364, 70 S. E. 2d 182 (1952) (land taken
for public highway); Myers v. Wilmington-Wrightsville Beach Causeway Co.,
204 N. C. 260, 117 S. E. 858 (1933) (cost of new bridge built to Government specifi-
cations when old bridge ordered destroyed) ; Hiatt v. Greensboro, 201 N. C. 515,
160 S. E. 748 (1931) (street in front of owner's lot changed from through street
to dead-end); Query v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 178 N. C. 639, 101 S. E.
390 (1919) (telegraph poles as additional servitude on fee even though land already
subject to easement for railroad right of way) ; Kirkpatrick v. Piedmont Traction
Co., 170 N. C. 477, 87 S. E. 232 (1915) (additional servitude on abutting owners
caused by commercial railroad in street); Donnell v. Greensboro, 164 N. C. 330,
80 S. E. 377 (1913) (continuing pollution of stream by municipality) ; Moore v.
Carolina Power and Light Co., 163 N. C. 300, 79 S. E. 595 (1913) (trees cut down
that are not interfering with the use of the street or sidewalk) ; Spencer v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96 (1904) (forced sale of railroad stock at
assessed value) ; State v. New, 130 N. C. 731, 41 S. E. 1033 (1902) (drainage
ditch dug through private land); Beach v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 120 N. C. 498,
26 S. E. 703 (1897) (lands of owner overflowed by backwater from dam);
Cornelius v. Glen, 52 N. C. 512 (1860) (removal of dam from private stream);
Pipkin v. Wynns, 13 N. C. 412 (1830) (using owner's river bank for ferry landing
although at point of public highway).
Instances where there was not a compensable taking are as follows: Spaugh v.
Winston-Salem, 234 N. C. 708, 68 S. E. 2d 838 (1952) (city's appropriation of
sewage system built by owner who had constructive knowledge of ordinance giving
city power to take without payment when incorporating new area) ; Hildebrand v.
Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 221 N. C. 10, 18 S. E. 2d 827 (1942) (highway
commission's assignment of right to maintain telephone line on its easement pursuant
to broad powers in condemnation judgment) ; Calhoun v. State Highway and Pub.
Works Comm'n, 208 N. C. 424, 181 S. E. 271 (1935) (decreased value of the lot
caused by grade change in established street) ; Pemberton v. Greensboro, 208 N. C.
466, 181 S. E. 258 (1935) (owner restrained from discharging sewage in his own
stream when it is source of city's water supply) ; Hudson v. Town of Morganton,
205 N. C. 353, 171 S. E. 329 (1933) (owner forced to abandon own land through
fear of prosecution for trespassing on "watershed" set up without any physical
entry on part of city) ; Turner v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 174 N. C. 522,
93 S. E. 998 (1917) (servitude on adjoining lot owner when street used for street
railway) ; Crowell v. City of Monroe, 152 N. C. 399, 67 S. E. 989 (1910) (in-
convenience to lot owner by town's closing of part of street under police power) ;
Rosenthal v. Goldsboro, 149 N. C. 128, 62 S. E. 905 (1908) (city's removal of
owner's shade trees to preserve street sewers); Pool v. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297
(1877) (draining "wet lands" across land of another by virtue of police power
statute).
" Joyner v. Conyers, 59 N. C. 78 (1860).
1957]
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those who have been allowed a recovery are: one tenant in common, al-
though the other tenant had already given a grant to the taker ;44 the
developer of a subdivision when its water system was appropriated by
the city, even though many of the lots had been sold ;45 and the purchaser
at a foreclosure sale of land from which the mortgagor, without the con-
sent of the mortgagee, had granted a right of way instead of forcing the
taker to condemn.46 Even a lessee may recover damages when his right
of ingress and egress was obstructed by the condemnor building a rail-
road.47 Both the life tenant and the vested remainderman of the land
taken may recover, 48 but the clerk holds the award for contingent re-
maindermen in trust.49 And it would seem that a mere possessor of land
might be entitled to compensation. 0
Condemnation must be for a public use:
Condemnation is not proper unless it is exercised for a public purpose,
to be determined by the right of the general public to use or benefit from
the use of the property rather than by the extent of the actual use.51
The question of whether condemnation is for a public use is a judicial one
to be decided by the courts.5 2 Condemnation for such things as electric
light poles,5 3 schools,5 4 public highways and railroads 5 are obviously for
public purposes; the court has gone so far as to say that condemnation
for a public street is a taking for a public use as a matter of law. 0 The
modem trend seems to allow condemnation for purely aesthetic pur-
poses.57 The use may be public although managed by a private corpora-
tion, as where a toll road is open to all the public upon payment of a
reasonable fee.58
"Hill v. Glendon and Gulf Mining and Mfg. Co., 113 N. C. 259, 18 S. E. 171
(1893).
" Stephens Co. v. Charlotte, 201 N. C. 258, 159 S. E. 414 (1931).
" Liverman v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 109 N. C. 52, 13 S. E. 734 (1891).7 South Atlantic Waste Co. v. Raleigh, C. & So. Ry., 167 N. C. 340, 83 S. E.
618 (1914).
'"Joyner v. Conyers, 59 N. C. 78 (1860).
" Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007 (M. D. N. C. 1938) ; Miller v.
Asheville, 112 N. C. 769, 16 S. E. 765 (1893).
o See Pace v. Freeman, 32 N. C. 103 (1849).
' Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 288, 51 S. E. 932, 934 (1905)
(dictum).
"2 Cobb v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 172 N. C. 58, 89 S. E. 807 (1916) ; Call v. Town
of Wilkesboro, 115 N. C. 337, 20 S. E. 468 (1894). The Federal Rule seems to be
that Congress may decide what type of taking is for a public use. United States
ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546 (1945).5 Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 74 S. E. 460 (1912).
" Board of School Trustees v. Hinton, 165 N. C. 12, 80 S. E. 890 (1914).
"Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).
" Jeffress v. Town of Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911).
"TBerman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), noted in Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 482
(1955) (redevelopment of blighted areas); Yarborough v. North Carolina Park
Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928) (park).
" Mountain Retreat Ass'n v. Mount Mitchell Development Co., 183 N. C. 43,
110 S. E. 524 (1922). Although the legislature cannot authorize the owner of
[Vol. 35
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Change in the public use:
For one taker to be able to condemn the property of one also having
the power of condemnation, there ordinarily must be a legislative grant of
this particular power in express terms or by necessary implication. 59
Such a taker must show necessity and must exercise the right with as
little interference as it can without a great increase in cost and incon-
venience.00  The power of the North Carolina State Highway and
Public Works Commission to condemn land within a city for highway
purposes is an example of this.61 Without special legislative authority,
one taker cannot spoil the plan of another by condemning lands needed by
the other who is free from unreasonable delay, bad faith, or abandonment
of the condemnation purpose.62 There is general language in the cases
to the effect that entry for a new and different use is a taking, without
regard to the extent of the injury, and such new entry can be made only
when the new use is public.63 Thus, it is generally held that the owner
should be compensated for takings where additional servitudes which
cause additional damages are placed on the land. A telegraph company
placing its poles on lands over which a railroad has an easement must
pay for this privilege.64 Yet a street car company does not have to
pay the owner of the fee for tracks laid down the street because this does
not materially increase the burden on the land.0 5 In another situation,
Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Waterpower Co. 66 held that the legislature
may substitute a new public use not more burdensome to the owners of
the fee than the old public use without making additional compensation
for a retaking; the court's theory was that the owners were not entitled
to claim a forfeiture of the original easement because their possibility of
reverter is a contingent claim, defeasible at the will of the state.
standing timber to build a railroad or tramway over the lands of another to remove
such timber because this would be a taking for a private use, the statute providing
that the timber owner may condemn a right of way for a cartway is valid. Cozard
v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905). Condemnation for a cart-
way, on the other hand, is justified upon the ground that cartways are regarded as
quasi-public roads intended to be publicly used to some extent, although they are
laid out on the application of particular individuals, paid for by them, and designed
for their special accommodation. Waldroup v. Ferguson, 213 N. C. 198, 195 S. E.
515 (1938).59Yadkin County v. High Point, 217 N. C. 462, 8 S. E. 2d 470 (1940).00 Virginia & C. So. R. R. v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 161 N. C. 531, 78 S. E.
68 (1913).
"I Sechriest v Thomasville, 202 N. C. 108, 162 S. E. 212 (1932).
02 Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 188 N. C. 128,
123 S. E. 312, writ of error dismissed, 267 U. S. 586 (1924).
"' Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 219 N. C. 402, 14 S. E. 2d
252 (1941).
0 eoQuery v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 178 N. C. 639, 101 S. E. 390 (1919).
STurner v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 174 N. C. 522, 93 S. E. 998 (1917).
6 111 N. C. 439, 16 S. E. 402 (1892). Cf. Charlotte Park and Recreation
Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. 2d 114 (1954), cert. denied 350 U. S.
983 (1956), noted in Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 482 (1955).
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Right of party to object to condemnation:
It has been held that any taxpayer subject to general tax assessment
for the cost of the taking may object to the condemnor's appropriating
property for an improper or private use.67  But the right to object is
much clearer when asserted by one whose property will be directly af-
fected by the condemnation. The taking may be said to be for a private
use when the substantial benefit is for a private individual and the
benefit to the condemnor is only incidental and prospective, 8 and it
hardly needs to be said that only with the consent of the owner can prop-
erty be taken for a private use. 69 But the fact that the condemnor is
authorized or allegedly intends to engage in private as well as public
business is no objection to condemnation. 70 The objector must wait
until the property is actually used for private purposes before he can
maintain the action of quo warranto to compel cessation of the private or
improper use.71 The owner cannot usually enjoin the taking of his prop-
erty by a municipality even if the purpose is to create what would be a
nuisance, which could be enjoined if committed by a private individual.7 2
An injunction pendente lite could probably be secured by the owner,
however, where the taker flatly denies the owner's application for com-
pensation.73 In addition to one's right to resist condemnation where
such is for an improper use is his right to resist condemnation where
the condemnor has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. However, unless
the action of the condemnor is so unreasonable, arbitrary or unjust, as
to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion, the courts
"' Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394 (1899). But cf. Shaw v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 226 N. C. 477, 38 S. E. 2d 313 (1946) ; Peters v.
Pasquotank Highway Comm'n, 184 N. C. 30, 113 S. E. 567 (1922).
6' Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394 (1899).
Winchester v. Byers, 196 N. C. 385, 135 S. E. 774 (1928).
7o Wadsworth Land Co. v. Piedmont Traction Co., 162 N. C. 314, 78 S. E. 297
(1913).
71 Ibid.
"' Rhyne v. Flint Mfg. Co., 182 N. C. 489, 109 S. E. 376 (1921) ; Rhodes v.
City of Durham, 165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914). See Town of Selma v.
Nobles, 183 N. C. 322, 111 S. E. 543 (1922), where it was held that since the
cemetery for which the town proposed to take the property would create a nuisance
this amounted to a condemnation of adjacent property rights; injunction against the
town was granted because the town had no power to condemn residential property.
Later, the court in Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N. C. 671, 71 S. E. 2d 396 (1952), dis-
tinguished this case and held that the landowner intervening in the condemnation
proceedings could not prevent or collect damages for the nearby erection of an ele-
vated water tank on the ground that it would constitute a nuisance. This was said
to be a permature action since the tank had not yet been erected, a water tank not
being a nuisance per se. Damages were held proper, though, because of the city's
condemnation of negative easements or restrictive covenants. In McKinney v.
High Point, 237 N. C. 66, 74 S. E. 2d 440 (1953), the elevated water tank had
already been erected and was painted a bright silver which reflected the sun's rays,
causing blinding glare. The landowner recovered on the ground that this cheapen-
ing of his property was a taking of his land without just compensation, though
the court refused to hold the tank might constitute a nuisance.
" Luther v. Commissioners of Buncombe County, 164 N. C. 241, 246, 80 S. E.
386, 388 (1913) (dictum).
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will not interfere.7 4  Even an allegation that the condemnor's charter
was a fraud will not be considered.7 5
The nteasure of compensation:
The measure of compensation has been stated in a number of ways.
It is said to be the just equivalent for the property taken; Tf it is also
defined as the sum which probably would be arrived at as a result of fair
negotiations by an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy
after due consideration of all elements reasonably affecting value ;7 again,
the measure is called the balance struck between the damages and benefits
conferred.78 Perhaps one of the most familiar rules grows out of the
situation where the condemnor takes only an easement over a small part
of a total tract; here the measure of damages is defined often as the
difference, caused by the taking, in the value of the land before and after
the taking.7 9 The underlying idea seems to be that the owner is entitled
to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if the property had not been
taken. Applying this rule, the owner is entitled to be paid only for the
value of the property to him, and not for its value to the condemnor. 80
Generally, however, all the capabilities of the property and all of the uses
to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted may be considered
insofar as they affect its value in the market.8 '
The value of the property is awarded only as of the time when the
condemnation proceeding was begun; no prior or subsequent fluctuation
in value can be considered.12 The price that the owner was offered or
that he actually paid for the property at some remote time prior to
condemnation is permissible only as impeachment testimony.83 The
grantee of the owner is not allowed to sue for damages done to the land
74In re: Housing Authority Project N. C.-16-2, 235 N. C. 463, 70 S. E. 2d 500(1952). Lee v. Town of Waynesville, 184 N. C. 565, 115 S. E. 51 (1922).
"' Holly Shelter R. R. v. Newton, 133 N. C. 132, 45 S. E. 549 (1903) ; see Peters
v. Pasquotank Highway Comm'n, 184 N. C. 30, 113 S. E. 567 (1922).
"' North Carolina State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n, v. Black, 239 N. C.
198, 79 S. E. 2d 778 (1954) ; State v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 199 N. C. 199, 154 S. E.
72 (1930).
" United States ex rel. and For Use of TVA v. Powelson, 118 F. 2d 79 (4th
Cir. 1941).
's Elks v. Commissioners, 179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920); Southport,
W. & D. R. R. v. Owners of The Platt Land, 133 N. C. 266, 45 S E. 589 (1903).
" Ibid.; Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1911) ; Lambeth v.
Southern Power Co., 152 N. C. 371, 67 S. E. 921 (1910).
so Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss., 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. 2d 10 (1941).81Ibid.
8 Town of Ayden v. Lancaster, 197 N. C. 556, 150 S. E. 40 (1929) ; Western
Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N. C. 104, 136 S. E. 353 (1927). But see
State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Hartley, 218 N. C. 438, 11 S. E. 314
(1940).83 Palmer v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 195 N. C. 1, 141 S. E.
338 (1927) (18 years); Lloyd v. Town of Venable, 168 N. C. 531, 84 S. E. 855
(1915).
19571
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
before he acquired title,8 4 nor for damages to crops and use and occupa-
tion of the land-all this being considered "fruit fallen." 85  However,
the grantee can recover for fresh injuries.80
The only damages contemplated in the original condemnation pro-
ceedings are those that necessarily arise in the proper construction of
the work. Nuisance or negligence is not contemplated and the owner
does not have the right to collect damages for such torts in the original
grant of compensation. Instead, the owner must bring a separate action
to recover for work negligently done or which resulted in a nuisance.8
7
When the condemnation causes mere inconvenience to the owner in
the use of his property, this alone is no basis for compensation unless
there is also an actual impairment of the owner's ability to use the
property in a reasonable manner.88 Also, loss of profits or injury to an
established business is not an element of damages unless provided by
statute, because business as such is not "property" in the eminent domain
constitutional context.8 9
The owner is not restricted to compensation for the value of the
property physically brought under the taker's control, but may recover
damages for intangible injuries as well. Examples of this have been
recovery for increased dangers to person and property plus inconvenience
and annoyance not suffered in common with others;00 jarring, smoke,
noise, dangers of fire and cinders ;91 additional fencing made necessary ;92
actual damages to growing crops outside the right of way;93 loss of
church congregation ;94 depreciation in value of property due to poles and
trolley wires ;95 land made unfit for dairying by sewage disposal plant ;o0
and depreciation in value of lands not taken.97 On the other hand, the
condemnor may reduce the amount of recovery by showing such things
" Phillips v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902);
see Beal v. Railroad Co., 136 N. C. 298, 48 S. E. 674 (1904).
"Liverman v. Roanoke & T. R. R. R., 114 N. C. 692 19 S. E. 64 (1894).
"Phillips v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 526, 41 S. E. 1022,
1026 (1902) (dictum).
17 Spencer v. Willis, 179 N. C. 175, 102 S. E. 275 (1920) ; see Moses v. Town of
Morganton, 195 N. C. 92, 141 S. E. 484 (1928) ; Ingram v. City of Hickory, 191
N. C. 48, 131 S. E. 270 (1926).
88 Elks v. Commissioners, 179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920) (new road not as
convenient as old road which is still open).
"Pemberton v. Greensboro, 208 N. C. 466, 181 S. E. 258 (1935); State v.
Suncrest Lumber Co., 199 N. C. 199, 154 S. E. 72 (1930).
" Raleigh, C. & So. Ry. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 156, 85 S. E. 390
(1915).
'l Carolina & Y. R. R. R. v. Armfield, 167 N. C. 464, 83 S. E. 809 (1914).
' Raleigh & A. A. L. R R. v. Wicker, 74 N. C. 220 (1876).
Haislip v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 102 N. C. 376, 8 S. E. 926 (1899) ; cf.
Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
"Durham & No. R. R. v. Trustees of Bullock Church, 104 N. C. 525, 10 S. E.
761 (1889).
"Wadsworth Land Co. v. Charlotte Elec. Co., 170 N. C. 674, 88 S. E. 439
'1915).
"Pemberton v. Greensboro, 208 N. C. 466, 181 S. E. 258 (1935).
" Western Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N. C. 104, 136 S. E. 353 (1927).
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as that the land is already subject to an easement" or that the claimant
has only a life estate.99 Also considered is the uses and purposes to
which the property is reasonably adapted and might with reasonable
probability be applied,1'0 such as the eligibility of land for factory sites.1 1
The rental value of a building taken, the location and surroundings of
land, and any other factor which would normally affect the value of the
property may be considered.'0
2
Right of condemnor to offset benefits to realty:
One thing of great potential value to a condemnor is the right to
offset benefits, both special and general. This entails offsetting any in-
crease in the value of the owner's adjacent realty or of any estate re-
maining in the owner, caused by the condemnation, against the price due
for the land taken. Benefits have to result directly to the property from
the taking, but special benefits, unlike general ones, are not shared in
common with the whole vicinity. 1 3 The law as to offset, though, has
been subject to vacillation in North Carolina. These changes are ex-
plainable by virtue of the fact that granting or withholding this right of
offset rests in the sound discretion of the legislature. 0 4  Prior to 1872
railroads could offset only special benefits. 10 5 This was changed in 1871
when the legislature provided that no benefits could be offset by railroads;
but in 1891 the former principle was restored and special benefits could
be offset once more.10 6 In 1923 the General Asembly provided that
municipalities could offset both general and special benefits.' 07 This
same rule has applied to the North Carolina State Highway and Public
Works Commission since 1935.108 Thus, the charter or the statutes
applicable to the condemnor should always be consulted to determine if
special or perhaps even general benefits can be offset. G. S. § 40-18
seems to indicate, though, that today offset of special benefits is allowed
in the case of the usual condemnor. The right of municipalities and of
the Highway Commission to offset all benefits appears to be the result of
"Brown v. W. T. Weaver Power Co., 140 N. C. 333, 52 S. E. 954 (1903).
"' Miller v. Asheville, 112 N. C. 769, 16 S. E. 765 (1893).
1o Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 186 N. C.
179, 119 S. E. 213 (1923).
10 Teeter v. Postal Tel. Co., 172 N. C. 783, 90 S. E. 941 (1916). See Note,
34 N. C. L. REv. 545 (1956) for a discussion on the right to include the special
adaptability of the property for a dam site as an element of damages.
102 Railroad v. Land Co., 137 N. C. 330, 49 S. E. 350 (1904).1o1Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1911).
104 Goode v. Asheville, 193 N. C. 134, 136 S. E. 340 (1927) ; Elks v. Commis-
sioners, 179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920) ; Commissioners v. Johnston, 71 N. C.
398 (1874) ; Freedle v. North Carolina R. R., 49 N. C. 89 (1856).
10' Southport, W. & D. R. R. v. Owners of The Platt Land, 133 N. C. 266, 45
S. E. 589 (1903) ; Freedle v. North Carolina R. R., 49 N. C. 89 (1856)
" Southport, W. & D. R. R. v. Owners of The Platt Land, supra note 105.1 07 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 160-210 (1952).
100 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1952 & Supp. 1955) ; see Bailey v. State Highway
and Pub. Works Comm'n, 214 N. C. 278, 199 S. E. 25 (1938).
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a legislative policy favoring purely public agencies' 0 9 It should be noted,
however, that in no event may the special or general benefits exceed the
damages to the owner, for if this could happen the owner might be held
liable to pay the condemnor for taking his land.110
Landowner's right to be paid for the "full fee":
It is not what the condemnor actually does, but what it acquires the
right to do that determines the quantum of damages. 1 Therefore,
since the condemnor acquiring a perpetual easement acquires the right
to occupy and use the entire surface of the land for all time to the ex-
clusion of the landowner, for all practical purposes the bare fee is of no
value and the damages should be the same as if the fee were acquired.
The possibility of abandonment by the taker is so remote and improbable
that it is not allowed to be taken into consideration in determining the
value of the easement." 2 However, if the parties stipulate that the
owner may recover for any additional burdens placed on the land, an
instruction that the perpetual easement amounts to a fee for all practical
purposes is prejudicial error." 3 Generally, a person is entitled to the
damages in proportion to the period for which he suffers the en-
cumbrance, though special circumstances may alter the case. 114 Con-
tingent remaindermen have to wait until the termination of the prior
estate before payment is made, and the property, although converted into
personalty, is treated as realty upon distribution."15 After payment of
damages to the life tenant, the court may direct the clerk to invest the
balance and distribute it to the contingent remaindermen only at the end
of the life estate.116
Owner's right to interest:
The owner will get interest from the time of the condemnation judg-
ment except against the state or one of its agencies." 7 On trial de novo
in the superior court from the award it is error to give interest from the
..9 Elks v. Commissioners, 179 N. C. 241, 245, 102 S. E. 414, 416 (1920). Here
Chief Justice Clark said: "The distinction seems to be that where the improvement
is for a private emolument, as a railroad or water power, or the like, being only
a quasi-public corporation, the condemnation is more a matter of grace than of
right, and hence either no deductions for benefits are usually allowed, or only
those which are of special benefit to the owner, but where the property is taken
solely for a public purpose, the public should be called upon to pay only the
actual damages, after deducting all benefits, either special or general."
110 Goode v. Asheville, 193 N. C. 134, 136 S. E. 340 (1927).
"'Carolina Cent. Gas Co. v. Hyder, 241 N. C. 639, 86 S. E. 2d 458 (1955).
Ibid.; North Carolina State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n v. Black,
239 N. C. 198, 79 S. E. 2d 778 (1953).
US Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Clark, 243 N. C. 577, 91 S. E. 2d 569 (1956).
See Joyner v. Conyers, 59 N. C. 78, 82-83 (1860)
1 Miller v. Asheville, 112 N. C. 769, 16 S. E. 765 (1893).
"t Ibid.
raN. C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1953), Yancey v. North Carolina State Highway
and Pub. Works Comm'n, 222 N. C. 106, 22 S. E. 2d 256 (1942).
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date of the taking or from the date of tile award below in addition to the
jury's verdict of the value of the property; it is presumed that a jury,
properly instructed, has taken the interest factor into account in fixing
value." 8 The Federal rule, however, is that the Fifth Amendment, ap-
plicable only to the United States, requires interest from the date of the
taking.119
Informal condemnation of realty by award of permanent damages:
Prior to Ridley v. Seaboard & Roanoke R. R.120 the ordinary trespass
action for the wrongful taking of or entry qnto one's real property was
not available to the owner where the taker had condemnation powers.
The owner had to have his damages assessed according to the taker's
charter or general statutes.1 1 But the Ridley case espoused the idea of
"permanent damages," giving in effect an informal condemnation. The
idea is that where one having the right of eminent domain, or its
licensee' 22 or appointee,'23 enters on or takes land without resorting to
condemnation, either party 2 4 may demand that permanent damages be
awarded. Upon suit being commenced by the owner for permanent
damages, this ends the continuing trespass, and upon payment of the
damages assessed an easement passes to the taker.12 5 This informal
manner of condemnation is equivalent to formal condemnation, 126 and
such a taker cannot be ousted by ejectment.'2 7 The fact that a suit for
trespass may be barred after three years does not prevent a suit for
permanent damages12 8 because to recover such damages the owner must
show a continuing trespass rather than single acts of trespass. 129 The
conditions obviously must be existing when the action is brought.13 0 The
owner is not required to sue for permanent damages in the superior
court when the entry is wrongful, for the owner has the option to sue for
permanent damages or petition the clerk for assessment of damages. 1 1
His right to sue for permanent damages exists only against entities
having the power of condemnation, which means that the owner may
not of right have permanent damages assessed against a private corpora-
tion for the maintenance of a nuisance which the owner could have en-
118 City of Durham v. Davis, 171 N. C. 305, 88 S. E. 433 (1916).
a" Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007 (M. D. N. C. 1938).
120 118 N. C. 996, 24 S. E. 730 (1896).
2-1 Holloway v. University R. R., 85 N. C. 452 (1881).
12 White v. Northwestern N. C. R. R., 113 N. C. 610, 18 S. E. 330 (1893).
"' Brown v. Electric Co., 138 N. C. 533, 51 S. E. 62 (1905).
1'Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914).
'I" Mason v. Durham County, 175 N. C. 638, 96 S. E. 41 (1918).
1'2 Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N. C. 349, 37 S. E. 474 (1900).
• Porter v. Aberdeen & R. F. R. R., 148 N. C. 563, 62 S. E. 741 (1908).
"2"Love v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 221 N. C. 469, 20 S. E. 2d 337 (1942).
I-" Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939).
1 Ingram v. City of Hickory, 191 N. C. 48, 131 S. E. 270 (1926).
McMahan v. Black Mountain Ry., 170 N. C. 456, 87 S. E. 237 (1915).
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joined.13 2  The early cases on the subject held that the measure of
damages in the permanent damages action included past, present and
prospective damages, 13 3 but a more recent case appears to allow only
the value of the land at the time the action is brought.13 4 The Ridley
case applied the doctrine to railroads, but it has since been applied
to water companies. 135 telegraph companies, 3 6 canals,187 municipali-
ties, 138 and nuisance created by a municipality's discharge of sewage11B
The principle now seems broad enough to cover any taker with the power
of eminent domain.
Once the owner begins the permanent damages suit he may recover
although he conveys to a third party during the pendency of the action.
The theory which allows this is that when suit is begun the owner
terminates the continuing trespass by indicating his consent to grant an
easement upon payment of damages.' 40 However, if the owner does not
bring suit during the period of his ownership the right to sue for perma-
nent damages passes to the grantee, because the continuing trespass has
not in such a case been terminated.' 4' Where the grantor is granted
permanent damages, the grantee is estopped from denying that an ease-
ment passed to the taker 42
Nature of the proceedings:
After the prerequisite offer to buy has been made the taker begins the
condemnation with the institution of a special proceeding before the clerk
of the superior court.143 The general procedure is outlined in Chapter
40 of the General Statutes. 44 However, some condemnors may have
even the proper procedure outlined in their charters or in statutes special-
ly relating to them. 145
Although in the usual condemnation proceeding the clerk acts as a
judicial officer, an instance where he acts in an administrative capacity is
where condemnation is for school purposes.' 46 If the owner cannot show
cause why the taker's petition for appointment of commissioners of ap-
praisal should not be granted, the clerk orders the appointment of three
132 Langley v. Staley Hosiery Mills Co., 194 N. C. 644, 140 S. E. 440 (1927).
"I Porter v. Aberdeen & R. F. R. R., 148 N. C. 563, 62 S. E. 741 (1908).
... Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939).
"I Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N. C. 349, 37 S. E. 474 (1900).
13. Phillips v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 130 N. C. 582, 41 S. E. 805 (1902).
137 Mullen v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 130 N. C. 496, 41 S. E.
1027 (1902).
1 Harper v. Town of Lenoir, 152 N. C. 723, 68 S. E. 228 (1910).
"' Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914).Caveness v. Charlotte, R. &. So. R. R., 172 N. C. 305, 90 S. E. 244 (1916).
a Ibid
"*'Bruton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N. C. 1, 6 S. E. 2d 822 (1939).
"'Johnson City Ry. v. South & W. R. R., 148 N. C. 59, 61 S. E. 683 (1908).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40-11 through -29 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
.4 See Norfolk & So. R. R. v. Warren, 92 N. C. 620 (1885).
16 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 115-125 (Supp. 1955), Board of Education v. Allen, 243
N. C. 520, 91 S. E. 2d 180 (1956).
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disinterested freeholders to make the appraisal. 147 Since the assessment
of the commissioners is not a jury verdict, a majority vote is sufficient.148
And the fact that the commissioners are citizens of the town in which the
land to be condemned is located, and therefore subject to additional taxes
to pay for the land condemned, is no ground for disqualifying them; their
interest is considered too remote. 149
Not until the commissioners file their report of appraisal can an ap-
peal to the superior court be had, for prior to this time there is no final
judgment from which to appeal.'50 Although proceedings before the
clerk may be administrative in some cases, the proceedings in the superior
court are always judicial in nature.'5 ' Appeal can be made only to the
court in term, and not to the judge at chambers. 52 Here a trial de novo
is held as though no appraisal had been made, unless the superior court
judge in his discretion remands the proceedings to the clerk for a new
appraisal. 153 The tactic of appeal cannot be used as a device for delay.
The condemnor may take possession despite the appeal.' 54 . Since the
condemnor must make adequate provision for compensation such as the
posting of a bond as a condition of the taking, the owner is protected. 55
Because the statutory remedy is considered exclusive, the matter of
compensation is settled if there is no appeal, and the owner cannot later
maintain an action for damages.' 50 On an appeal to the superior court
the usual function of the jury is to pass on the issue of compensation, 57
but it may properly decide such questions as whether condemnation
would amount to a nuisance 5 8 or whether lands already condemned are
being used so as to exempt them from further condemnation.'19
Condemnation seems to be an in rem proceeding, and payment of the
award into court discharges the taker's obligation whether or not the
I7N. C. GEN. STAr. § 40-16 (1950).
"8 Austin v. Helms, 65 N. C. 560 (1871).
... Johnson v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550 (1874).
'"it re Baker, 187 N. C. 257, 121 S. E. 455 (1924).
IN. C. GEMq STAT. § 115-125 (Supp. 1955), Board of Education v. Allen,
243 N. C. 520, 91 S. E. 2d 180 (1956).
16' Cape Fear & No. R. R. v. Stewart, 132 N. C. 248, 43 S. E. 638 (1903).
13 Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Reeves, 198 N. C. 404, 151 S. E. 87 (1930);
Hanes v. North Carolina R. R., 109 N. C. 490, 13 S. E. 896 (1891).
State v. Jones, 139 N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905).
166 State v. Wells, 142 N. C. 590, 55 S. E. 210 (1906) ; Postal Telegraph-Cable
Co. v. Southern Ry., 89 Fed. 190 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1898) (telegraph company
was prohibited from entering until payment of amount assessed into court) ; Caro-
lina Cent. R. R. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C. 746 (1886); Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis,
19 N. C. 451 (1837).
16I Harwood v. Concord, 201 N. C. 781, 161 S. E. 534 (1931) ; Carolina Cent.
R. R_ v. McCaskill, 94 N. C. 746 (1886).
16' Board of Education v. Allen, 243 N. C. 520, 91 S. E. 2d 180 (1956) ; Madison
County Ry. v. Gahagan, 161 N. C. 190, 76 S. E. 696 (1912).
"'Town of Selma v. Noble, 183 N. G. 322, 111 S. E. 543 (1922).
... Blue Ridge Interurban R. R. v. Oates, 164 N. G. 167,80 S. E. 398 (1913).
19571
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
true owner of the land is known or ever receives the money. 10° By the
same token if the condemnor pays the award into court voluntarily and
without objection, labeling it as payment rather than as a deposit, the
owner may accept the "offer" and settle the question of compensation. 16
Generally, as to the assessment of damages, the owner is not entitled
to prior notice, but proper notice and an opportunity to be heard must be
given to enable the owner to attack the fairness of the assessment.10 2 The
procedure for giving this notice is usually found in the statutory or
charter provisions applicable to the condemnor, but the taker may be
able to proceed by giving actual notice to the owner where there is no
express provision.'0 3 Initial service of notice upon parties may be by
publication if they cannot be found after the exercise of due diligence.10 4
Once a proceeding has been commenced, because a motion made before
the clerk is in the same category as one made out of term in the superior
court, the clerk cannot make a determination on exceptions of a party
until all other parties are given notice and opportunity to be heard.10
The title and possessory rights in connection with condemnation:
Generally, the condemnor may take possession of the land before
compensation has been ascertained or paid.16 But since title does not
vest in the condemnor until final confirmation and payment of the amount
appraised, the owner may effectively convey or the condemnor may vacate
or take a nonsuit any time prior to confirmation and payment ;107 and,
the legislature can authorize the condemnor to decline taking the land
even after final judgment. 168 Although the condemnor does not acquire
the title until payment of the award of compensation, it is deemed owner
from and its title, once perfected, relates back to the time of the com-
mencement of the proceedings. 10 9 If the title of the purported owner is
denied by the condemnor, the one claiming to own the land has the
"I See N. C. GEx. STAT. §§ 40-14, -19, -22 to -24 (1950 and Supp. 1955) ; United
States v. Burnette, 103 F. Supp. 645 (W. D. N. C. 1952).
101 North Carolina State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n v. Brann, 243 N. C.
758, 92 S. E. 2d 146 (1956); North Carolina State Highway and Pub. Works
Comm'n v. Pardington, 242 N. C. 482, 88 S. E. 2d 102 (1955).
102 Kinston v. Loftin, 149 N. C. 255, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908) ; Dickson v. Perkins,
172 N. C. 359, 90 S. E. 289 (1916) ; Luther v. Commissioners, 164 N. C. 241, 80
S. E. 386 (1913) ; State v. Jones, 139 N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905). As to cart-
ways being condemned, notice and opportunity to be heard must be given to the
owner as a prerequisite to the taking, for this is primarily a contest between
individuals. Waldroup v. Ferguson, 213 N. C. 198, 195 S. E. 615 (1935).
103 Luther v. Commissioners, 164 N. C. 241, 80 S. E. 386 (1913).
.0. Brown v. Doby, 242 N. C. 462, 8 S. E. 2d 921 (1955).
10. Collins v. North Carolina State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n, 237
N. C. 277, 74 S. E. 2d 709 (1953).
100 State v. Lyle, 100 N. C. 497, 6 S. E. 379 (1888) ; see note 155 supra.
"" Nanaala Power and Light Co. v. Whiting Mfg. Co., 20D N. C. 560, 184 S. E.
489(1936); Caveness v. Charlotte, R. & So. RR., 172 N. C. 305, 90"S. E. 244(1916); Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N. C. 97, 63 S. E. 180 (1908).
108 State v. Floyd, 204 N. C. 291, 168 S. E. 222 (1933).
100 Ibid.
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burden of proving his ownership,170 and the condemnor may show that
the title is in some third person.171
Statute of limitations:
Property may be acquired by the state or condemnor by user or
adverse possession for the requisite period, in addition to grant, dedica-
tion, or condemnation."' 2 If the charter of the condemnor provides that
all claims for compensation must be made within a certain time, this is a
positive statute of limitations and bars all claims of parties sui juris not
made within that time.' 7 3 But if the statute or charter is silent as to
when the claim for compensation must be brought, the owner may sue
any time before the period for adverse possession or prescription has
expired. 74
GERALD CORBETT PARKER
Insurance-Automobile Liability Policies-Proportionate Distribution
for Multiple Claimants
Multiple claims arising under an automobile liability insurance policy,
when the insured motorist is insolvent and the proceeds of the insurance
fund are insufficient to cover all claims, have created a situation in which
some of the claimants find that instead of receiving compensation for their
injuries, they will receive only a valueless judgment against the tort-
feasor.
This situation is growing; one has only to look at the records to see
that deaths and injuries on our highways are increasing; that judgments
are larger, resulting in a corresponding increase in settlements. The
coverage of insurance policies is relatively small in comparison to these
increases.
To illustrate, suppose that A, the insolvent motorist, negligently col-
170 Fuller v. Elizabeth City, 118 N. C. 25, 23 S. E. 922 (1896).
1U Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N. C. 97, 63 S. E. 180 (1908). A trap was
laid for the title searcher in Norman Lumber Co. v. United States, 223 F. 2d 868
(4th Cir. 1955), which held that the North Carolina statutes relating to recording
and cross-indexing of judgments have no application to federal judgments of
condemnation. This means that the title lawyer must inquire at the office of the
Clerk of the United States District Court before his title is cleared. As to parties
other than the United States, condemnation judgments must be recorded and cross-
indexed in the office of the superior court clerk of the county in which the land is
located, but judgments are recorded as special proceedings judgments and are
exempt from the requirements as to registration of deeds. Carolina Power &
Light co. v. Bowman, 228 N. C. 319, 45 S. E. 2d 531 (1947). Nevertheless, such
judgments must include a description of the land and the estate or interest se-
cured by the condemnor. Beal v. Durham & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 298, 48 S. E.67U 1904).Sexton v. Elizabeth City, 169 N. C. 385, 86 S. E. 344 (1915).
171 Carolina Cent. R. R. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C. 746 (1886).
'17 Carolina & N. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51 S. E.
2d 301 (1949) ; Love v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 221 N. C. 469, 20 S. E. 2d
337 (1942).
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